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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
SHIRLEY BERUBE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
Case No. 20673
FASHION CENTRE, LTD. dba
FASHION GAL OF OGDENf
JOSEPH E. TORMAN dba WESTERN
STATES POLYGRAPH and JOHN and
JANE DOES 1-10f
Defendants-Respondents, *
ISSUES PRESENTED

Background.

The Plaintiff, Shirley Berube, was an employee

at the Defendant Fashion Centre Ltd.'s Ogden, Utah retail outlet.
As a result of inventory shortages at the Ogden store, the
employer requested that all store employees submit to a polygraph
examination.

The Plaintiff submitted to a polygraph test but

later was requested to submit to a second polygraph test. The
Plaintiff willingly submitted to the second polygraph test.
Shortly thereafter, the Plaintiff was requested to submit to a
third polygraph test. When she failed to report for the third
polygraph test, the employer terminated her employment, notwithstanding her request to have it rescheduled.

SB1 Appeals I

Issues,

The decisions of this court on their face cause the

normal employment relationship in Utah to fall within what has
been generally referred to as an "at-will" employment relationship.
This case presents the following questions in the above
context:
(1)

Is the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (inherent

in all contracts under Utah law) present in an "at-will" employer/
employee relationship?
(2)

If sof did the Trial Court err in failing to properly

instruct the jury, as a matter of lawf that an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing was an inherent aspect of the
employment relationship?
(3)

Does Section 34-37-16(2) Utah Code Annotated prevent

employers from terminating employees for failure to take or pass
a polygraph examination?
(4)

Did the District Court err in denying the Plaintiff the

right to amend her complaint to plead a breach of the statutory
duty set forth in Section 34-37-16(2)?
(5)

Did the District Court err in granting partial summary

judgment dismissing the causes of action against the first
polygraph examiner and the employer when the court held that the
proximate cause of the employee's termination was the failure of
the employee to take the third polygraph test and was notf as
alleged by the Plaintiff, casually connected with the negligent
administration and interpretation of the first examination?

(6) Whether the District Court erred in denying Appellant's
motion for a new trial on the grounds set forth in the motion,
namely that the District Court's instructions to the jury did not
accurately reflect or state the correct law, i.e., assuming that
Utah law recognizes a claim for relief based upon breach of an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, whether the
District Court's instructions to the jury properlv stated the
law as to whether or not a written contract or anv specific duration of employment needed to be established before the jury could
consider whether the employer breached the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing inherent in their employment relationship.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
1/
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Rule 51 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
RULE 51
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY: OBJECTIONS
At the close ot the evidence or at such earlier
time during the trial as the court reasonably
directs, any party may file written requests that
the court instruct the jury on the law as set
forth in said requests. The court shall inform
counsel of its proposed action upon the requests
prior to instructing the jury; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such
instructions may be given orally, or otherwise
waive this requirement. Tf the instructions are
to be given in writing, all objections thereto
must be made before the instructions are given to

1/
Pertinent parts have been emphasized by appellant's counsel.

the jury; otherwise, objections may be made to the
instructions after they are given to the jury, but
before the jury retires to consider its verdict.
No party may assign as error the giving or the
failure to give an instruction unless he objects
thereto in the matter to which he objects and
the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding
the foregoing requirement, the appellate court,
in its discretion and in the interest of justice,
may review the giving or failure to give an
instruction. Opportunity shall be given to make
objections, and they shall be made, out of the
hearing of the jury.
Arguments for the respective parties shall be
made after the court has instructed the jury. The
court shall not comment on the evidence in the
case, and if the court states anv of the evidence,
it must instruct the jury that they are the exclusive judges of all guestions of fact.
Section 34-37-16 Utah Code Annotated (enacted 1981 provides:
§34-37-16. Surreptitious examinations prohibited.
It shall be a violation of this act to conduct a
deception detection examination by the instrument
without the phvsical presence of the subject and
through a surreptitious manner where a subject is
not aware of the examination. Furthermore, it
shall be unlawful for: (1) any deception detection
examination to be conducted by instrument by outof-state examiners through telephonic means to
anyone in Utah or for Utah examiners to use
telephonic means to determine truth or deception;
or (2) refusal to submit to such examination to be
the basis for denying or terminating employment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.

This case is an appeal from the Second

Judicial District Court in and for the County of Weber, Utah,
the Honorable David E. Roth presiding at trial.

The Plaintiff

Shirely Berube asserted below that the termination of her
employment by the Defendant Fashion Centre Ltd. constituted a
breach of the convenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent

in their employee-employer relationship (contract) and sought a
determination by the court that the employer had breached the
contract and was liable for damages accordingly.
In addition to the foregoing, the complaint alleged a cause
of action against the first polygrapher and the employer relating
to the negligent administration, interpretation and reporting of
her first polygraph examination which resulted in subsequent
request for additional tests and ultimately in her termination
from employment.
summary judgment.)

(This latter cause of action was dismissed at
The Complaint also alleged defamation and

interference with prospective economic advantage.
Disposition by Lower Court.

Following a four day jury trial,

the trial court entered an order of "no cause of action" in accordance with the jury's response to Question 1 of the special
Interrogatories submitted.

The jury determined that based on the

evidence and the law as contained in the Jury Instructions, that
there was no employment contract which existed between the
employer and the employee.

Consequently, the jury never reached

the issue of whether the employer breached the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
The additional causes of action plead in the complaint were
disposed of by rulings of Judge Walquist, Judge Hyde and Judge Roth
at various stages of the pre-trial proceedings and during trial as
set forth more fully below.
Relief Sought on Appeal. The Plaintiff Shirley Berube seeks
a final ruling of this court regarding the issues set out at

pages 2-3.

In the event the court holds that there were errors in

the proceeding below, then she would request the court to remand
the case for a new trial with sufficient clarifications to allow
the trial court to proceed to a final resolution of this case.

1/

Statement of Facts.

Plaintiff Shirley Berube was employed

by the Defendant/Respondent Fashion Centre as assistant manager
at the Ogden, Utah store.

(R. 96 L. 18)

She had advanced from

sales person to assistant manager receiving good/very good/
superior ratings.

(Ex. 5P, R. 880 L. 10 - R. 896 L. 25.)

There

was no written employment agreement between the partiesr but
Fashion Centre, the employer, did have written rules and regulations regarding personnel practices.
L. 10 - R. 872 L.13.)

(See Exhibit IP, R. 871

Specifically, the employer had rules

relating to the taking of polygraph tests. These rules provided
that: "Except in the situations listed below, an employee may not
be dismissed. . . An employee may be terminated without prior
warning for the following reasons:
(a) . . .
(g) refusal to take a polygraph test."
(h) . . .
(See Exhibit P. 1)

1/
All citations are to the record of the proceeding below as
paginated by the clerk pursuant to Rule 11(b) and 24(e) U.R.A.P.,
including the transcript. Where necessary, references to lines
of transcript will be shown as (R. 771 L. 2-10) meaning paginated
record, page 771, lines 2-10. All exhibits are referred to as
Ex.
and are contained in the record at R. 352.

Fashion Centre concluded an inventory shortage had occurred
in the previous year and requested the store employees to take a
polygraph test.

(R. 897 L. 11-14)

The Plaintiff took the test

along with approximately nine other store employees.

(Three store

employees refused to submit and were allowed to quit.

R. 901-902)

The polygraph test was conducted by the Defendant, Western
States Polygraph, using questions supplied by the employer Fashion
Centre.

No background information or investigation was provided

Western States concerning the inventory shortages. (Exhibit 12 P.)
Following her polygraph test, the Plaintiff inquired as to
whether or not she had passed the examination.

She was informed

by the examiner that she had indeed passed the examination and he
even commented to her in a joking manner that she would not have
to look for a new job while on her upcoming vacation.

(R. 643)

The polygraph examination administered by Western States
was a relevant/irrelevant polygraph exam.

(R. 276, 279, Para. 6A)

The questions supplied by the Defendant Fashion Centre necessitated that this type of examination be used.
is prohibited by state polygraph regulations.

This type of test
(R. 279, Para. 6A)

The summary of the polygraph test communicated by Western States
to Fashion Centre showed that the Plaintiff was answering truthfully when asked the following Fashion Centre relevant questions:
2.

Did you ever steal or cheat that FASHION GAL store out
of any cash?

3.

Did you steal any cash at that FASHION GAL?

4.

Have you used any scheme to steal or cheat that
FASHION GAL store?

5.

Did you ever steal any merchandise from that FASHION
GAL store?

6.

Did you ever remove any merchandise from that FASHION
GAL store without paying for it?

7.

Did you ever help anyone, in any way, to steal merchandise or money from that FASHION GAL store?

8.

Did you ever deliberately allow merchandise to be removed
from that FASHION GAL store without it being paid for?

9.

Have you ever intentionally failed bo register a VISA
or Master Card sale?

10.

Have you ever given or written a false merchandise credit
or refund?

11.

Have you ever intentionally recorded a false payment on
a layaway?
MANAGEMENT QUESTIONS ONLY

12.

Have you ever falsified the Daily Report in any way?

13.

Have you ever falsified Mark Downs?

14.

Have you ever falsified any company documents for
personal gain or benefit?

15.

Have you knowingly violated any company policy with
the intention of cheating the company out of money or
merchandise?

See Exhibit 12 P.

Fashion Centre was acutely aware of what the

employee had passed since they designed and supplied the questions
used in the polygraph examination.

(R. 876-877)

The examiner,

however, reported he found deception when the Plaintiff was asked
the following question, "Do you know for certain who has cheated
or stolen anything from that Fashion Gal store?" Plaintiff
answered "no" to the question.

A post test interview discloses

the following explanation with regards to the alleged deception.

-8-

"Post test - She stated that although she doesn't
know for certain of others - She has very strong suspicions of others - especially those who threatened to
quit rather than take polygraph test." (See Exhibit 12 P.)
The test did not show deception as the Defendant Fashion
Centre has maintained throughout this case.

(R. 780-781)

Western's summary communicated to Fashion Centre states that the
subject showed deception onlv on the one question/ not the test and then immediately disclosed sufficient facts to explain why
there may have been a stress reaction to the question.

When Mr.

Torman was asked whether the communication from his company to
Fashion Gal disclosed whether or not Shirley Berube, the
Plaintiff/ passed the examination, he stated:
"Wellf she herself did not show any signs of attempted
deception according to this. In other words, there's
nothing here to indicate anv deception on her part as
far as any dishonesty towards the company."
(Torman deposition/ pages 57-58.)

Fashion Centre, however,

interpreted that she had failed the examination.

(R. 905 L. 23-24

to R. 907)
As a direct result of Western State Polygraph's report/ the
employer requested the Plaintiff submit to a second polygraph test
which the employee willingly did and passed.

(R. 907 L. 8-9)

The

second test was conducted by a different polygraph company
(Polygraph Screening Services) which utilized a specific polygraph
test as opposed to relevant/irrelevant test conducted by Western.
(R. 279/ Para. 6B)
The affidavit of Bennett Lerner (submitted in support of the
employer's motion for summary judgment) states that the purpose of

the second test was to give the Plaintiff an opportunity to "clear
herself of any deception."

(R. 212)

Polygraph Screening Services

informed the employer that the Plaintiff was truthful when she was
asked the following relevant questions (R. 908-910):
1.

Do you know for certain who has cheated or stolen
anything from that FASHION GAL store?

3.

Did you steal any cash at that FASHION GAL?

5.

Did you ever steal any merchandise from that FASHION
GAL store?

8.

Did you ever deliberately allow merchandise to be
removed from that FASHION GAL store without it being
paid for?

See Exhibit 13 P.
Shortly thereafter, the employer requested the Plaintiff take
a third polygraph examination, which she refused.

The employer

never identified to the Plaintiff the outcome of the first test
(R. 645) although they did disclose to the Plaintiff that she had
passed the second examination.

(R. 645-648)

She failed to report

for the third test as she felt that the company was attempting to
trick her into having a poor examination so that they would have
grounds for termination.

She felt the request for a third test

2/

was abusive and was an affront to her honesty.

The Plaintiff was

2/
The Plaintiff submitted herself to the second test knowing only
what she had been told by Western States. (The Plaintiff did not
find out what was communicated to Fashion Centre until shortly
before her deposition taken around February 7, 1984, when the
weekend prior to the deposition documents were made available to
Plaintiff's counsel pursuant to a request for production of documents and it became clear during the deposition that the deposition examiner assumed that the Plaintiff knew a reason why the
second polygraph test was required.)

confused by the Defendant's demands for successive tests and
sought out the advice of friends and family who advised her not
to take the third test.

(R. 650-651 & R. 912)

In view of the

Plaintiff's failure to report for the third polygraph test, the
employer terminated the Plaintiff's employment, notwithstanding
her request to have it rescheduled, which was made the after her
termination.

(R. 656)

Fashion Centre's regional manager, Jerry Brooks, wrote in
the personnel file of the Plaintiff the following:
On April 28, 1982, Shirley Berube was scheduled
to take her third polygraph in connection with
10/1/81 shortage on the inventory. She failed
to pass her first polygraph and passed the
second one given. She was then required to
take a third polygraph to establish a result
from the first two. She declined to take the
final polygraph.
(R. 917-918, See last page, Exhibit 5P.)
At the time of termination Fashion Centre's District Manager,
Mr. Wilson, represented that he would reinstate the Plaintiff if
she would change her mind, which she did within 24 hours conceding
to submit to the third examination.

However, Mr. Wilson had

already filled Ms. Berube's position and no action was ever taken
to rehire her.

(R. £57-658)

Thereafter, Plaintiff in seeking other employment applied at
"Brooks" as well as other retail stores in the Ogden area.
Exhibits 8P & 14P, R. 826.)

(See

When the manager of Brooks called the

Defendant Fashion Centre for a reference, JoLynn Flint, manager of
the Defendant's Ogden Store, reported that the Plaintiff had
refused to take "a" polygraph test and that this was the basis

for her termination.
(R. 826-828)

Plaintiff was refused employment at Brooks.

The recommendation is of a type which chills

employment prospects greatly.

(R. 586f R. 595)

During depositionsf Joseph ^orman dba Western State
Polygraph, testified that the first polygraph examination given
to the Plaintiff did not meet the minimum standards of the
polygraph profession.

(Torman deposition pages 46-47.) Because

Judge Hyde dismissed the negligence aspect of the case on summary
judgement the trial court did not allow questioning in this area
at the time of trial.
Attached as part of the Plaintiff's reply to the Motion for
Summary Judgment submitted by the Defendant, Fashion Centref was
the affidavit of the Plaintiff's polygraph expert indicating that
the Plaintiff passed both examinations and that the Defendants
Fashion Gal and Western States were negligent in interoreting
otherwise.

(R. 276-284)

The affidavit further disclosed that

it was unreasonable for the Defendant Fashion Centre to require
a third polygraph examination taking into consideration the type
of tests given, i.e., that the Plaintiff passed the examinations
particularly the second test which was a specific examination an examination designed to specifically ascertain Plaintiff's
honesty - as opposed to the first examination which was characterized by the Defendant Western States during depositions as a
"fishing expedition."

(R. 771, Line 2)

The Plaintiff's expert

further characterized Fashion Centre as negligent in not providing
background information from which the examiner would frame the

-12-

questions and contributed and induced the examiner to violate
state polygraph regulations by requesting a polygraph test with
the question format supplied by Fashion Centre.

(R. 276-284)

Plaintiff continued to look for work in the retail trade but
was only able to find temporary part-time, seasonal (Christmas)
work.

Shortly after discovering that Brooks had obtained the

false reference. Plaintiff filed suit alleging causes of action
as follows:
1.

Negligence in the administration, interpretation

and reporting of the first polygraph examination as
against both the polygrapher, Joseph Torman dba Western
States, and the employer Fashion Centre.
2.

Defamation as against both the employer and the

polygrapher.
3.

Wrongful termination (both ex contractu and ex

delicto) as against the employer.
4.

Interference with prospective economic advantage

as against the employer.
5.

Intentional and negligent infliction of emotional

distress as against the employer.

(See R. 1)

Shortly after filing the complaint the employee moved the
court to allow an amendment to the complaint to allege an
additional cause of action for wrongful termination based upon
§34-37-16(2).
the complaint.

(R. 30)

Judge Walquist denied the motion to amend

(R. 101)

-13-

The District Court (Judge Hyde) dismissed at the summary
judgment stage the causes of action set forth in paragraphs 1
and 5.

(R. 302)

During trial/ Judge Roth dismissed the causes of action
alleged in paragraphs 2 and 4 (R. 955-958) and gave the jury
instructions set forth at R. 322-348 as to the wrongful termination cause of action.

Following the entry of the order on

the jury verdict, the Plaintiff moved the court for a new trial
(R. 447-484) which was denied.
taken.

(R. 499)

This appeal was then

(R. 501)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I.

An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists

in all contracts under Utah Law.
(a)

The basic nature of an employer-employee relation-

ship is contractual.

Notwithstanding the "at-will" classifi-

cation of the relationship (as opposed to a contract of
employment of specific duration) the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is an inherent aspect of the "at-will"
employment contract.
(b)

The jury instructions materially mistated the

applicable law by requiring the jury to find an employment
contract before considering the evidence as to whether the
employer breached the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
(c)

The Trial Court erred in failing to grant the

Plaintiff's motion for a new trial.

The interests of justice

require the law concerning "at-will" employment relationship
be clarified.
II.

The District Court committed error in denying the

Plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint to include a cause of
action for wrongful termination based upon Section 34-37-16(2)
U.C.A. which declares it unlawful to terminate an employee for
failure to pass or submit to a polygraph examination.
III.

The District Court committed error when it granted partial

summary judgment and dismissed the negligence cause of action
against Western States Polygraph and the employer.

Western States

Polygraph and the employer owed the Plaintiff a duty to conduct
and interpret the polygraph examination in a prudent manner.

As

a direct result of Western's breach of this duty, the employer
requested additional examinations which ultimately led to the
Plaintiff's termination.

The Trial Court erred when it removed

this factual issue (causation-causal connection) from the jury
and granted partial summary judgment ruling that Plaintiff was
terminated for failure to take the third polygraph examination.
ARGUMENT
I
THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
IMPLIED BY LAW IN ALL CONTRACTS IS INHERENT
IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS, INCLUDING A
TRADITIONAL "AT-WILL" EMPLOYMENT/EMPLOYEE
CONTRACT. THE BREACH OF THE COVENANT TO
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING CAN RESULT IN
A CAUSE OF ACTION MATURING FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT.

-IS-

Over the past few yearsf several courts have made numerous

£/
inroads to the Doctrine of Employment At-Will.
"In the past five years, virtually every state
court has had to confront whether and how to
curtail an employer's reliance on the employment
at-will rule. Employers had relied on the rule
to discharge employees in their absolute discretion except as limited by statute or contract.
Now a majority of jurisdictions to varying
degrees have abrogated emoloyment at-will by
recognizing causes of actions for wrongful
discharge. . ." Springer, ^he Wrongful Discharge
Case, Trial, June 1985, at p. 38.
These inroads are a result of the inherent unfairness of the tra5/
ditional rule. Increasingly, the courts have been willing to
recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge even where the
employment is of an indefinite duration or where the employee is

1/
See Note, Protecting At-Will Employees Against Wrongful
Discharge; The Dutv to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 Harv.
L. Rev. 1816 (1980); Rohwer, Terminable-At-Will Employment; New
Theories for Job Security, 15 Pac. L. Jour. 759 (1984); Blades,
Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom; On Limiting the Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Col. L. Rev. 1404 (1967); Note,
Implied Contract Rights To Job Security, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 335
(1974); See generally, Employment-At-Will Subcommittee, Employment
and Labor Relations Law Committee; ABA Litigation Section, 1984
Report (Aug. 4, 1984). See also 1 and 2 Employment-At-Will
Reporter (May 1983 - January 1985); ALI-ABA Course of Study,
Advanced Labor and Employment Law - 1984 "The Developing Law of
Wrongful Termination" pp. 511-610 1984 Handbook, Co-sponsored by
ABA Labor and Employment Law Section, July 16-20, 1984, Boulder,
Colorado; Annotation, Discharge of At-Will Employee, 12 ALR 4th
544 (1982).

1/
Judge Meyer of the New York Court of Appeals refers to this
as "The bizarre origin of the termination at-will rule. See text
at Footnote 1 Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 448 N.Y. 2d
86 (New York) 1983. See also pp. 760-762 Relating the historical
development of the employment relationship, Rohwer, Terminableat-Will Employment: New Theories for Job Security, infra, footnote 4 above.
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As the case has progressed, this author i :F T:he opinion that
the cause of action, is ex contract*
' ho ^han ex delicto. See
Bec
:
k v. Farmers, Ins. Exchange,
, 1 7 Ut. Adv. Rep. 3
( No."18926, filed June 12, 1.98 5; 7 ~

l^

In Bihlmaier v. Carson, Utah, 603 P.2d 790 (1979) the Court
refused to grant relief to an employee who had alleged that his
employer had breached the oral employment contract between them.
The plaintiff claimed that his employer had constructively
discharged him by writing on his home loan application that his
"continued employment depends upon applicant, who is hired on a
trial basis only."

603 P.2d at 790. The Court reiterated the

general rule in Utah stating:
The general rule concerning personal employment
contracts is, in the absence of some further express
or implied stipulation as to the duration of the
employment or a good consideration in addition to
services contracted to be rendered, the contract is
no more than an indefinite general hiring which is
terminable at the will of either party. (id. 791
emphas i s suppli ed.)
See also Crane Company v. Dahl, 576 P.2d 870 (Utah, 1978) and
Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 354 P.2d 559 (Utah,
1960).
The Bihlmaier Court, however, cited in support for reaching
its decision, the Idaho case of Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation
District, 563 P.2d 54 (Idaho, 1977), where the Idaho Supreme Court
recognized a cause of action for wrongful termination.

It must

also be noted that the Utah Supreme Court has also held in a
recent case that a personnel policy manual gives rise to employee
contractual rights. Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College,
Utah, 636 P.2d 1063 (1981).
It was submitted to the trial court by the Plaintiff that the
Fashion Centre policy manual constituted "the express or implied"
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How many tests would

she have been required to submit to?

Does such conduct constitute

a breach of the implied covenant of good faith inherent in all
contractual relations?
It is submitted by the Plaintiff that the foregoing policy
constitutes an "express stipulation" to the employment contract
between the parties as well as creates the basis upon which the
Defendant breached the "implied" covenant of good faith inherent
in their employment contract.
The Bihlmaier case discussed above is the most recent case
discussing the general rule. This case restates the general law
as establishing an at-will employment contract as "terminable at
the will of either party" unless some express or implied conditions to the employment contract exist.
of reasoning are not new.

This language and line

See the case of Held v. American Linen

Supply, 6 Utah 2d 106, 307 P.2d 210 (1957).

This case is

interesting because this case specificallv addresses a situation
in which there were express contractual provisions added to the
at-will employment contract.
The court in American Linen Supply stated:
Whether respondent has a cause of action if she were
discharged without just cause depends upon the terms
of the contract, either express or implied, as stated
in 35 Am Jur Section 34, page 469,
"In the absence of something in the contract
of employment to fix a definite term of service,
or other contractual provisions to restrict
the right of the employer to discharge, or
some statutory restriction upon this right, an
employer may lawfully discharge an employee
at what time he pleases and for what cause he
chooses, without thereby becoming liable to an

action d-jaimi . i-n qeneval cor-tiact *•'
hlrinq is ordinarilv deemed ^ cont* .:* terminable at the .;'1 of either the employer or
the employee- .
• Whether in anv particular
case an employer can discharqe his employee
without cause, and not inci ir a. liability is a
question to be resolved with reference to th^
express and implied terms of the contract. . .f!
i d.7 pages 21 ] 2] 2 (Emphasis supplied)
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personnel manual, which the District Court found
to govern the terms of the contract between the
college and its employee, was the sole means by
Which the college could extinguish the contractual relationship
This result compo:i : t 3 i 1 :I: I what we dee:i rt t :: • 1: • *
sound policy for c :: • i Itra :: tua 1 e m p l o y e r • • BI ITI: 1 oy ee
relations. It will encourage employers to comply
prompt!y with their contractua1 termination pro
cedures, and if they fail to do so will impose
the monetary consequences on the party at fault.
If the rule were otherwise, the employer would
discharge the employee summarily and then omit
or delay the contractual termination procedures
with inipi inity so long as it was in possession of
evidence which, when ultimately provided, would
justify the discharge. In that circumstance, the
employee, without notice of the reason for his
dismissal and without any opportunities to refute
the charges, would remain in an indefinite and
painful state of limbo, uncertain about his
ultimate right to reinstatement or back pay. If
our rule works any hardship on employers, they
can afford it bv prompt and substantial compliance
with the procedures to v/hi ch th<~-- hn\*^ agreed.

.. •

Where as ii I tl lis case the policy and oiocedure manual provide

specific instances and cause for termination and otherwise prohibit termination, the Defendant Fashion Centre was bound to those
terms and conditions.

The express terms of the contract as well

as implied terms existing in all contracts under Utah law provide
a basis with which the Plaintiff is allowed to proceed for recovery.
C.

IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.

Utah has long recognized that an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is inherent in every contract entered into
in this state. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, Utah,

P.2d

1985 (12 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 No. 18926 filed 6/12/85); Leigh
Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, Utah, 657 P.2d 293 (1982); Prince
v. Elm Co. Inc., Utah, 649 P.2d 820 (1982); W.P. Harlin
Construction Co. v. Utah State Road Commission, 9 Utah 2d 364, 431
P.2d 792 (1967).
Restatement, Second, Contracts, Section 205 flatly provides:
"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and
fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."

This con-

cept is also recognized in Section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial
Code as well as by Williston Contracts (3rd edition §670, 1295)
which tells us in Section 1295 (volume 11, page 39) that:
"Wherever, therefore, a contract cannot be carried out the way
in which it was obviously expected that it should be carried out
without one party or the other performing some act not expressly
promised by him, a promise to do that act must be implied."
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D.

UTAH LAW SHOULD FOLLOW THE MAJORITY RULE
THAT HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN OTHER STATES.

The Utah law discussed above is not new nor is such unusual.
Recent cases from other jurisdictions have adopted positions similar to that expressly provided for by Utah law.
Interpretation of employee handbooks and personnel policies
or practices as a contract.

The following cases have held that

the employee handbook/ personnel policies or employment practices
constitute express provision of an employment contract.
Toussant v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich.
579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) employee discharged without good cause
under employer's policy manual which states that it was the
company1s policy to require good cause for discharge and that the
employee had also been told that as long as he did his job well he
would have a job with Blue Cross; these representations the court
concluded gave the employee legitimate expectation of job security
on which he could base a cause of action in contract for
discharge.

See also Winer v. McGraw Hill! Inc. 457 N.Y.S.2d

193, 443 N.E.2d 441 (1983); Yartzoff v. Democrate Harold Printing
Co. 281 Ore. 651f 576 P.2d 356 (1978), Southwest Gas Corporation
v. Ahmad, 668 P.2d 261 (Nev. Supreme Court 1983); and Smith v.
Carville Bus Company, Inc., 709 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1983).
In addition to these cases, the following cases have found
that certain practices as well as the written employment contract
included a duty of good faith and fair dealing.

Gates v. Life of

Montana Insurance Company, Montana, 668 P.2d 213 (1983) (discharge
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Second,

Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff's counsel failed

to preserve the error (by failing to except to the instructions
given with the requisite specificity) the Suoreme Court in its
discretion and based upon the interests of justice should review
the failure to give a proper instruction because state law is sufficiently vague and confusing that the failure to frame a proper
instruction should not be attributed as error to the Trial Court
or either party.
1.

The Trial Court did not follow the "law of the case"

established by Judge Hyde's "ruling on motion for summary
judgment."
At the conclusion of the Plaintiff's and Defendants' cases,
Judge Roth instructed the jury on the law (R. 322-348) and then
submitted the matter to the jury on four interrogatories (See R.
350-351).
following:

Question 1 required the jury to answer yes or no to the
"Question No. 1:

"At the time Plaintiff's employment

with the Defendant was terminated, was an employment contract in
existence?"
The Plaintiff would respectfully submit that the Trial Court
erred in requiring the jury to determine that at the time the
Plaintiff was terminated there was an employment contract in
existence.

It appears that the jury and/or the court misun-

derstood the Plaintiff's position relative to the breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing aspect of the
case.

The Plaintiff would submit that there was an employment

contract in existence, albeit oral, and the jury was confused.
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Defendant Fashion Centre Ltd. Memorandum of Law appears at
R. 1 74-207; Motion for Summary Judgment appears at R, 208-211;
Affidavit of Bennet Lerner at R.212-213. Defendant Torman dba
Western States Polygraph Motion for Summary Judgment at R. 216219 and Memorandum of Law at R. 220-229. Plaintiff's Memorandum
responding to Defendant Torman's Motion for Summary Judgment
appears at R. 238-254, Although the Plaintiff's affidavits
opposing summary judgment appears at R. 259-26-1; R. 266-269,
and R. 276-2 84, the Plaintiff's memorandum, of law responding trFashion Centre has not been paginated by the Clerk of the Dirt-*
Court but is contained in the manilla envelope marked R, 81.
Hopefully this was an oversight and Judge Hyde did n •'. make his
r t 12 i n g s w I t h o \ 11 t h e ben e f i t o f t h i s M e m o r a n d u IT •

In disposing of the three pending motions, Judge Hyde,
following argument, issued his "Ruling on Motion for Summary
Judgment" (R. 288-291).

A full copy of the Ruling is reproduced

as Appendix 3 of this brief.

At page 3, Judge Hyde ruled that two

questions were to be submitted to the jury.

The questions of

"whether or not the policy manual is the 'express or implied'
exception to the 'at-will' rules, together with the questions of
good faith and fair dealing."

(R. 290) (Emphasis supplied.)

However, in submitting the case to the jury on the four
special interrogatories, the two issues which Judge Hyde ruled
were to go to the jury were not preserved.

The issue of whether

or not the employment personnel policies and procedures created
an express limitation upon the at-will employment relationship
was preserved; however, the other issue which judge Hyde identified, i.e., whether or not the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing was violated at the time of discharge, was not
preserved.
Counsel for the Plaintiff attempted during the proceedings
(see R. 945 L. 21-25) to point out the significance of Judge
Hyde's ruling and that once made Judge Hyde's ruling became the
law of this case until reversed or clarified upon appeal.
Sittner v. Big Tar Sands & Oil, Inc., Utah, 692 P.2d 735 (1984) •
The trial court, however, instructed Plaintiff's counsel
that the trial court interpreted Judge Hyde's ruling differently.
(R. 945 L. 25 to R. 946 L. 3)

The trial court had already
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2 Utah 2d 364f 274 P.2d 962 (1954); c.f. Rule 51 U.R.C.P. which
"gives this Court some latitude to consider objections not properly preserved below."
P.2d

Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co.,

, 15 Utah Adv. Rep. 16 (08/06/85 No. 18623).

The Plaintiff would respectfully submit that unusual and
compelling circumstances exist in this case inasmuch as the Utah
law surrounding the at-will employee/employer relationship is
not clear.
termination?

Does there exist a cause of action for wrongful
Is such ex delicto or ex contractu in nature?

Is

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing a limitation
on the employer's ability to terminate the employee?

Are the

employment personnel policy and procedure manuals part of the
employment contract/relationship?
In addressing these issues, the trial judge requested proposed instructions.

One of the Plaintiff's proposed instructions

(part of R. 81) is attached hereto as Appendix 4.

Judge Roth

elected to give instructions 8, 13 and 15 (R. 330, 335 & 337)
which on their face seem to state correct law.

(See Appendix 5.)

Hpwever, the jury instructions taken together are incorrect
because as a matter of law, the employment relationship which
exists between the employer and the employee is a contract.
Merely because the employment relationship is "at-will" does not
destroy the underlying nature of the relationship from being
contractual.

The employee who is an "employee at-will" has a

fully effective employment contract just as if it were an express
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II
JUDGE WALQUIST'S SUMMARY DENIAL OF THE
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND HER COMPLAJNT
TO INCLUDE A CAUSE~OF ACTION BASED UPON
§34-37-16(2) WAS ERROR,
A.

Background

The P l a i n t i f f ' s
1983

comoliin?-

-*17.1 • wa.; f i l ^ d

>a " - t o b ^ r

I n 3 a t e Febri i a r y t h e Plain*-* r L t u e '

complaint

(R.41)

to allege

l

an a d a i L ^ n a l

^;v;se oi - i n .- •

based

upon a perceived violation of §34-37-16(2) as interpreted by the
Utah State Legislature, Office of Legislative General Counsel,
Opinion No. 81-012, which had subsequent to the filing of the
complaint come to Plaintiff's counsel's attention.
An objection (R.51) to the Plaintiff's motion to amend the
complaint was filed by the Defendant Fashion Centre.
8/

In accor-

dance with Rule 2.8, the Plaintiff filed a reply to the objection
(R.63) attaching thereto a complete copy of Opinion No. 81-012
(R.69) as well as the affidavit of the representative Dale
Stratford (R.74), the sponsor of the floor amendment to §34-37-16
U.C.A., which added subparagraph (2).
On April 18, 1984, the Plaintiff's motion came before Judge
Walquist (R.82).

After a short discussion with counsel for both

Plaintiff/employee and the Defendant/emplover, the Court summarily
(without reading or reviewing either parties' memoranda) denied
the Plaintiff's motion.

(A complete copy of the hearing is con-

tained in the record on appeal at R. 508 to R.518.)
B.

Discussion

The employer submitted to the District Court that the addition of a cause of action based upon Section 34-37-16(2) was
irrelevant and immaterial because they felt that §16(2) applied
only to "voice stress" examinations. However, the legislature did
not intend subsection (2) to be limited solely to "voice stress"
examinations, but wasnted subsection (2) to apply to all deception
detection examinations.
8/
Rules of Practice in District and Circuit Courts of the State
of Utah.
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2 to this brief).

The Floor Amendment placed a semicolon after

the word "deception," interjected the word

f,

£r" and then added

the separate second provisio in the statute.
It is submitted by the employee that the effect of the
Floor Amendment as such was to make the two provisions of the
statute operate completely in the disjunctive, otherwise, the
Legislature would not have used the word '"or." The second
proviso is a completely separate operative provision.
The Plaintiff would also submit that reference to "such
examination" is meant to specifically refer to a "deception
detection" which phrase qualifies the word "examination" used
twice previously in Section 16. This position is supported by
Legislative General Counsel's Opinion 81-012.
The foremost rule of construction of a statute is to achieve
legislative intent. "The intention of the Legislature, however,
should be controlling and no formalistic rule of grammer or word
form should stand in the way of carrying out the legislative
intent."

Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake City, Utah, 575 P.2d

705, 706 (1978).

In addition to this, the Utah Supreme Court in

the case of Brickyard Homeowners Association v. Gibbon Realities,
Utah, 668 P.2d 535, 538, (1983) recognized the duty axiomic upon
the court to interpret the statutes of the state liberally with
the view to effect their objects to promote justice.

Section

66-3-2 U.C.A., 1953 as amended.
The legislative history regarding this Section (see Appendix
2) discloses that Representative Stratford amended Section 16 on

the floor by including the second provisio after the disjunctive
f,

or" to effectuate adding an additional, separate remedy to the

Section.

It would seem incumbent upon the Court to realize that

the interpretation urged by the employer would accomplish the
same result had the Floor Amendment been excluded.

It makes the

Floor Amendment completely meaningless, i.e., the Legislature had
made voice detection examinations unlawful by the first proviso
and ipso facto since they were unlawful inside and outside the
state, then what would be the effect of making it unlawful for a
person who refuses to submit to such examination to be terminated
or denied employment.

You accomplish nothing by making the same

act unlawful twice. Presumptively, you must assume the
Legislature was attempting to add an additional limitation.
The Floor Amendment was intended to broaden the rights of
employees having to take the deception detection examinations as
defined in Section 2 of the Act (§34-37-2).
Representative Stratford - Appendix 1.)

(See Affidavit of

Furthermore, the facts

of this case disclose on the face of the Complaint that notwithstanding Plaintiff's passing said examinations, that the
Defendant nonetheless terminated her for refusing to submit to
a third polygraph examination.

The intended scope of Section 16,

as amended by Representative Stratford, was to broaden the rights
of the citizens of this state in having their employment relationship adversely affected on the basis of a deception detection
examination when such examinations are highly questionable.

See

comments 13 Houston L. Rev. 550-70 (1976); 30 Ark. L. Rev. 35-48

Spring 1976; 96 Banking L. Journal 313-24 (1979).

The proposed

amendment is not unique; at least 15 states including some immediate neighboring states have statutes which forbid employers from
requiring polygraph tests. See Footnote 1, 24 Cornell L. Rev. 29
(1977).

The neighboring states include Idahof Montana, Oregon,

Washington, California, Alaska and Hawaii.
The remedies provided for in Section 16 are intended to be
broad and to deal with three instances.

First, a surreptitious

examination - an examination given when the subject is not aware
of it.

Second, an examination given by an instrument which can

only measure voice stress or a "voice only" test.

Third, the

instance which an employee's refusal to submit to a polygraph
examination is used as the basis for denying or terminating
employment.
The employee would submit that as a matter of statutory
construction, this Court should construe the second provisio of
the statute as encompassing all deception detection examinations
to accomplish the obvious intent of the Legislature.

Any other

interpretation leads to an absurd result as pointed out in both
the legislative counsel's opinion and the affidavit of
Representative Stratford, the sponsor of the Floor Amendment.
The employee would respectfully submit that any other interpretation would be in violation of the principles espoused in
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake City, supra, and allow a formalistic rule of grammer or a word to stand in the way of carrying
out legislative intent.

For the reasons outlined above, the Plaintiff would submit
that Judge Walquist's ruling, denying the Plaintiff's motion to
amend the complaint to state an additional cause of action based
upon §34-37(2) was prejudicial error.
Ill
JUDGE HYDE ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE "NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF
ACTION" WHICH ALLEGED THAT THE PLAINTIFF
WAS TERMINATED AS A RESULT OF THE POLYGRAPHER AND EMPLOYER'S NEGLIGENCE IN
ADMINISTERING, INTERPRETING AND REPORTING
THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST POLYGRAPH TEST.

£/

As mentioned earlier the cross motions for summary judgment
came before Judge Hyde on December 7, 1984. Judge Hyde dismissed
the negligence causes of action asserted by the Plaintiff against
the polygrapher and the employer ruling as a matter of law that
"the taking of the [first] test, the method of taking
[administering] the test, or the interpretation of the test
was not the cause of the discharge of Plaintiff.

The cause of

her discharge was the failure to take the third polygraph test."
(R. 291)
The Plaintiff would respectfully submit that by so ruling,
Judge Hyde determined a question of fact and removed the causation
issue, normally a factual question from the jury and committed
error by qranting summary judgment to the Defendants.

1/
See Pages 27-28 of this brief.

The issue of proximate cause is ordinarily a matter to be
submitted to the jury for its determination.

Mitchell v. Pearson

Enterprises, Utahf 697 P.2d 240 (1985); Harris v. Utah Transit
Authority, Utah, 671 P.2d 217 (1983).

The Plaintiff should not

have been deprived of the privilege of having an adjudication on
her claim unless it appears that even on the facts claimed by her
she could not establish her claim.

Watters v. Querry, Utah, 626

P.2d 455 (1981); Rees v. Albertsons, Inc., Utah, 587 P.2d 130
(1978); Jensen v. Dolen, 12 Utah 2d 404, 367 P.2d 191 (1962).
The Restatement, Second, Torts §328B. and §328C. succinctly
set forth the rules concerning the role and function of the judge
and the jury relative to issues of facts.

Section 328B. provides:

§328B. Functions of Court
In an action for negligence the court determines:
(a) whether the evidence as to the facts makes
an issue upon which the jury may reasonabley find
the existence or non-existence of such facts;
(b) whether such facts give rise to any legal
duty on the part of the defendant;
(c) the standard of conduct required of the
defendant by his legal duty;
(d) whether the defendant has conformed to
that standard, in any case in which the jury may
not reasonably come to a different conclusion;
(e) the applicability of any rules of law
determining whether the defendant's conduct is
a legal cause of harm to the plaintiff; and
(f) whether the harm claimed to be suffered
by the plaintiff is legally compensable.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 328C. provides:
§328C. Functions of Jury
In an action for negligence the jury determines,
in any case in which different conclusions may
be reached on the issues:
(a) the facts,
(b) whether the defendant has conformed to
the standard of conduct required by the law.

(c) whether the defendant's conduct is a
legal cause of the harm to the plaintiffy and
(d) the amount of compensation for legally
compensable harm. (Emphasis added.)
In defining proximate cause, this court in Mitchell v.
Pearson Enterprises, supraf stated:
The standard definition of proximate cause
is "that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening
cause), produces the injury and without which
the result would not have occurred. It is the
efficient cause-the one that necessarilv sets
in operation the factors that accomplish the
injury."
In opposing the Defendant's motion for summarv judgment, the
Plaintiff introduced the affidavit of an expert witness whose credentials disclosed that he was a professor of psychology at the
University of Utah and possessed 15 years of training and research
as well as substantial experience and training in the use of the
polygraph.

(R. 276)

Substantial evidence was adduced in this

affidavit which raised a material question of fact whether the
Defendants' negligence set in motion a force which ultimately
caused the Plaintiff's injury - termination from employment.
W

A single sworn statement is sufficient to create an issue of

fact.

Clearly, it is not for a court to weigh the evidence or

assess credibility."

Webster v. Sill, Utah, 675 P.2d 1170 (1983).

But for the Defendant Fashion Centre's negligence in
designing the questions and the negligence of Western in administering and interpreting the results, it is undisputed that
the second and third polygraph tests would not have been required.
The Defendant Western maintained that the discharge of the

employee by the employer was because of her refusal to submit to
the third polygraph test and that it had nothing to do with the
first examination.

This position was completely contrary to the

affidavit of Bennet Lerner, Vice President - Personnel (R. 212)
which indicated that the reason the second and third tests were
requested was because the first polygraph showed "deception"
(paragraph 3) and the company wanted to give the employee an
opportunity to "clear herself" (paragraph 4) and requested the
third polygraph to "reconcile" with the other two (paragraph 6)
(see also R.905, lines 24-25f and R. 907, lines 8-24).
There was no counter-affidavit filed by Western contradicting
Mr. Lernerfs affidavit.

The District Court should not have

granted summary judgment dismissing the negligence cause of action
as there was a material question of fact whether the negligence
committed in the course of the first exam was causally connected
with the Plaintiff1s termination.
In Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, Utah,

P.2d

f

18

Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (No. 19573 filed September 20, 1985) this court
held:
In an appeal from a summary judgment,
we view the evidence and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the losing party.
Hall v. Warren, Utah 632 P.2d 848 (1981);
accord Blackhurst v. Transamerica
Insurance Co., Utah 699 P.2d 688 (1985).
Summary judgment should be granted with
great caution in negligence cases.
Williams v. Melby, Utah 699 P.2d 723
(1985). Issues of negligence ordinarily
present questions of fact to be resolved
by the fact finder. It is only when the

facts are undisputed and but one reasonable conclusion can be drawn therefrom
that such issues become questions of law.
FMA Acceptance Co. v, Leatherbv Insurance
Co., Utah, 594 P.2d 1332 (1979). Likewise, oroximate cause is usually a
factual issue and in most circumstances
will not be resolved as a matter of law.
Unigard Insurance Co. v. City of LaVerkin,
Utah, 689 P.2d 1344 (1984). This case
poses no exception.
Whether the negligence of the Defendants was the proximate
cause of the Plaintiff's termination was a question for the jury.
From the evidence before the court, a jury could have reasonably
found that the negligence associated with the first polygraph was
the proximate cause of the termination and accordinqly hold the
Defendants liable.

The court invaded the province of the jury

when it granted summary judgment to Western and Fashion Centre on
the grounds that the proximate cause was the employee's failure
to take the third polyqraph test when it was scheduled.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff would respectfully submit that the questions
raised by this appeal relative to the rights and obligations of
employees and employers in traditional at-will employment contracts are important issues which can be resolved under existing
principles of law concerning contracts. The implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing which has universally been recognized
as existing in all contractual relationships is a limitation on
the employer's right to terminate the employee.

The termination

must be done in good faith, even if the employer's power to

terminate the employment relationship is one under which the
employer has this right to terminate at-will (See Comment (e) §205
Restatement, Second, Contracts).

There is no compelling reason

to read out of an at-will employment relationship the implied
covenant of qood faith and fair dealing, regardless of the fact
that the employment relationship is one traditionally or legally
classified as at-will.
The issues are of significant importance that the law in Utah
should be clarified.

Because of the uncertainty regarding this

area of the law, the case should be remanded to the trial court
with such instructions as will enable the claims to be adjudicated
to a final conclusion including the claims of negligence and the
cause of action based upon §34-37-16(2) U.C.A.
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of October, 1985.
HARBflvi, PRESTON, GUTK@/& CHAMBERS

•as&r"

George/w. Preston, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

^f.
eph M. Chambers, Esq.
torney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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to Theodore E. Kanell, Esq., HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH, 650
Clark-Learning Office Center, 175 South West Temple, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84101, Attorney for Respondent Fashion Centre Ltd. and
four copies to Thomas S. Taylor, Esq., CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR &
MOODY, 55 East Center Street, P.O. Box 1466, Provo, Utah 84601,
Attorney for Respondent Joseph E. Torman on this
October, 1985.
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AFFIDAVIT OF REPRESENTATIVE
*
DALE E. STRATFORD

VS.

FASHION CENTRE, LTD.
dba FASHION GAL OGDEN,
*

Civil No. 871L3

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
County of Weber

)
(ss.
)

Dale E. Stratford, being first duly sworn, deposes and
states as follows:
1.

That I am an attorney duly admitted and licensed to

practice law in the State oftftah,a State Senator and former
member of the House of Representatives of the State of Utah.
2.

That I first became a state legislator in January, 1977,

and I was a member of the House of Representatives in 1981, the
year Section 34-37-16 was passed into law prohibiting the refusal
to submit to polygraph examinations from being used as the basis
for terminating or denying employment.
3.

That the information contained herein is based upon my

own personal knowledge.
4.

That I was the sponsor of the 1981 Floor Amendment to

Section 34-37-16 which amendment I proposed intending to amend

APPENDIX "1

said Section to include an additional provision making it unlawful in this state to deny or terminate employment upon the basis
of an individual refusing to submit to a deception detection
examination, otherwise known as a polygraph examination.
5.

That it was my intent in sponsoring the Floor Amendment,

and as I explained upon the floor of the House of Representatives,
that this amendment was to prohibit employers from discharging
employees who refused to submit to deception detection examinations which as defined in Section 2 of the Act includes polygraph
examinations, and not merely to prohibit voice stress examinations
or telephonic tests which were already encompassed in Section 16
prior to the Floor Amendment.
6.

That my purpose in sponsoring this amendment was to

clarify public policy in the state of Utah relative to employers
utilizing polygraph examinations as the basis for either terminating or denying employment when such examinations are not
wholly accurate and can be abused and misused by employers. The
Floor Amendment brings Utah in line with our neighboring sister
states who have enacted similar protective provisions.

See Idaho

Code §§44-903 to 904 (1977); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. §41-119 (Cum.
Supp. 1975); Ore. Rev. Stat. §659-225, 990(7) (1975); Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. 44-4944 120-130 (Supp. 1976); Cal. Lab Code §432.2 (West
1971).
7.

That by referring to "such examination" I intended to

refer to "deception detection examination" as defined in Section
2 of the Act and as such the phrase "deception detection"

qualifies the word examination used twice previously in Section
16.

I did not intend to refer to voice only or voice stress exa-

minations or out of state examinations conducted by telephonic
means.

That although I can now see the language utilized was

somewhat ackward, I did not intend nor do I believe the Legislature
intended that "such" refer to voice only or out of state telephonic examinations which leads to an absurd result of making it
unlawful to base the termination or denial of employment upon the
refusal of an employee or prospective emplovee to submit to an
unlawful examination.

This was not what was intended and that is

why I proposed the Floor Amendment adding the semicolon after the
word "deception," and added the disjunctive "or" and then the
operative language of the second provisio.
8.

Further Affiant saith not.

DATED this {# ~ day of April, 19.84.

R^iTesfent^tive Da^fe E. Stratford
Subscribed and sworn to before me this L?
1984.

Commission Expires: ///pp
Residing at: /
/ *,
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Does Subsection 34-37-16 (2), Utah Code
Annotated 1953, categorically prohibit
deception detector tests as the basis for
denying or terminating employment?
Yes, but in a rather awkward manner,
FACTS

The "Deception Detection Examiners Act" was amended
during the 1981 General Session of the 44th Legislature by
Senate Bill No. 173.

In its original form, Section 34-37-16

of the Bill was drafted as follows:
"It shall be a violation of this act to
conduct a deception detection examination without
the physical presence of the subject and through
a surreptitious manner where a subject is not
aware of the examination. Furthermore, it shall
be unlawful for any deception detection examination
to be conducted by out-of-state examiners through
telephonic means to anyone in Utah or for Utah
examiners to use telephonic means to determine
truth or deception."
The section was subsequently modified by a floor amendment
in the House of Representatives to read, in pertinent part:
"Furthermore, it shall be unlawful for; (1)
any deception detection examination to be conducted by instrument by out-of-state examiners
through telephonic means to anyone in Utah or
for Utah examiners to use telephonic means to
determine truth or deception; or (2) refusal to
submit to such examination to be the basis for
denying or terminating employment."
The amendment was adopted by the House after brief comments
by the sponsor of the floor amendment.

The amended version

was ratified by the Senate v/ithout comment and signed into
law by the Governor.

Subsequent to the passage of Senate Bill No. 173, the
Utah State Liquor Control Commijsion attempted to require
its employees to sign a statement that they would take a
polygraph examination in connection with their employment
with the Commission.

The statement included a provision

that refusal to submit to an examination could result in
dismissal or termination.

The Utah Public Employees Association

has formally challenged this policy and the matter is
presently in litigation.
The question presented for analysis focuses on the
extent of coverage of Subsection 34-37-16 (2), i.e., whether
it applies to all deception detection examinations that
relate to an individual's employment, such as the Liquor
Control Commission matter, or only to limited instances that
are qualified by the language of Section 16.
ANALYSIS
The sole question presented for analysis is one of
statutory construction as to the. meaning of "such examination"
in Subsection 34-37-16 (2) .

"Examination" is defined in

Section 34-37-2 of the Bill:
"As used in this act:
(2) 'Examination1 means the use of an
instrument on an individual for the purpose of
deception detection."
It would be relatively easy to interpret the meaning of
"examination" as used in Subsection 34-37-16 (2) if the
floor amendment had not included the word "such," which is
a referential or qualifying word.
The general rule regarding referential or qualifying
words is well and clearly stated in 2A Sutherland, Statutory
Construction (4th Ed., Sander, 1973) 159:
"Referential and qualifying words and phrases
where no contrary intention appears, refer solely
to the last antecedant, which consists of the
last word, phrase or clause that can be made an
antecedant without impairinj the meaning of the
sentence. Thus a proviso usually is construed to
apply to the provision or clause immediately
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preceding it. The rule is but another aid to
discovery of intent or meaning, however, and not
an inflexible and uniformly binding rule. Where
the sense of the entire act requires that a
qualifying word or phrase apply to several
preceding (emphasis added) or even succeeding
sections, the word or phrase will not be restricted
to its immediate antecedent."
A strict or literal reading of Section 34-37-16 would have
"such" referring back to Subsection (1), so that "such
examination" would be qualified or limited by the descriptive language of that Subsection.

However, if the rule is

so applied, then it becomes unlawful to base the termination
or denial of employment on one's refusal to take an unlawful
examination.

The result of applying this interpretation is

both absurd and unreasonable.
As noted in Sutherland, supra, the doctrine of the last
antecedent is not inflexible and is never applied when a
further extension is clearly required by the intent and
•meaning of the context or when to apply the rule literally
would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result defeating the
legislative purpose.

See also Johnson v. Craddock, 228 Or.

308, 365 P.2d 89 (1961); Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake
County, 568 P.2d 738 (1977).

Strict application of the

doctrine is inappropriate in Subsection 34-37-16 (2).
"Such" is defined by Webster as "having the particular
quality or character specified; certain; representing the
object as already particularized in terms which are not
mentioned."

State v. Estep, 66 Kan. 416, 71 P. 857 (1903).

Its meaning, however, is not to be determined solely by the
dictionary definition, but also by the entire paragraph, the
mischief it was designed to remedy, and its underlying
policy.

Bahre v. Hogbloom, 162 Conn. 549, 295 A.2d 547

(197 2 ) .

"Such" refers to something which has been mentioned

before.

Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Main, 240 Or. 533, 402

P.2d 746 (1965) .
The reasonable interpretation of "such examination" is
manifest by referring back to the definitional section of

the Bill and applying the broad definition cited therein and
used throughout the Bill to Subsection 34-37-16 (2). The
meaning of the context then becomes reasonable and harmonious
with the rest of the Bill in that it would be unlawful to
make a refusal to take any or a^ (emphasis added) deception
detection examination, as defined in Section 34-37-2, the
basis for denying or terminating employment.

Courts have

held that "such" may be interpreted in statutory context to
mean "any,"

Struthers v. People, 116 111. App. 481 (1904),

or "an Evans v. Commonwealth, 44 Mass. (3 Mete.) 453.
Additionally, Sutherland, supra, at pp. 221, 222 states:
"In the course of deliberation on a bill,
legislators look to its sponsor as well as to
the representative of the committee having
charge of it, as one who is expected to be
particularly well informed about its purpose,
meaning, and intended effect. In recognition
of this reality of legislative practice, courts
give consideration to statements made by a bill's
sponsor on grounds similar to those relied on to
support the use of statements by the committeeman
in charge of the bill."
Schwegmann Bros, v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384,
95 L.Ed. 1035, 71 S.Ct. 745 (1951); Stevens v. United States,
440 F.2d 144 (CA 6th, 1971).

The representative who sponsored

or proposed the floor amendment, while not the original
sponsor of the Bill, was the only individual who spoke to
the amendatory language.

His comments were brief as follows:

"Fellow Representatives, we have and have had
for some time a serious problem with these individuals that run and operate these particular types
of businesses. Many businesses nowadays have
gotten into the business of requiring all employees
to submit to these examinations. If an individual
refuses to submit to an examination, they are
immediately fired or released from their position.
I think this is the type of thing we need to
address and we as a body can address it and I think
it needs to be addressed responsibly."
There was no further discussion or committee action on this
amendment in either the House or the Senate.

The Represen-

tative's comments clearly appear directed to deception
detection examination as generally related to employment
matters, not to the use of telephonic examination.
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The

placement of the amendment is awkward and the use of "such"
makes the interpretation difficult but not impossible in
light of the above analysis.
Finally, it is a well-established rule of statutory
construction that where the language of a statute is susceptible
of two constructions, one of which in its application will
render it .reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest
purpose, and another which would be productive of absurd
consequences, the former construction will be adopted.
Reuter v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Cal. 314, 30 P.2d
(1934).

417

Of the two constructions, certainly the application

of the broad definition of examination as used throughout
the Bill appears to be reasonable, fair and harmonious.
literal construction of "such," if used in a strictly

The

referential

sense, is not mandated and if applied would be absurd as
indicated above.

There can only be but one reasonable

construction and that has been determined by examining the
application of referential and qualifying rules, analyzing
the definitions and use of "such," looking to the intent of
the sponsor of the amendatory language and applying the
construction that is fair and harmonious.

"Such examination"

must be interpreted to refer to any deception detection
examination as defined in Subsection 34-37-2
Bill.

(2) of the

In retrospect, the entire construction problem could

have been avoided by making Subsection 34-37-16

(2) a separate

section, i.e., 34-37-17, or changing the word "such" to
"any" or "an."
Respectfully

submitted,
tcu-

James L. Wilson
Associate Legislative General Counsel
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

W

SHIRLEY BERUBE,

RULING ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
FASHION CENTRE, LTD., et al.,

Case No.

87113

Defendant.

Basic relevant facts aref as I understand themf that the
Plaintiff Shirley Berube was employed by the Defendant Fashion
Gal as an assistant store manager at the Ogden store.

There was

no written employment agreement between the parties, but Fashion
Gal did have written rules and regulations regarding personnel
practices.

Specifically, Fashion Gal had rules relating to the

taking of polygraph tests, which provided that "an employee may
be terminated without prior warning for the following reasons:
(g) refusal to take a polygraph test."

Defendant Fashion Gal

concluded that they had an inventory shortage and requested their
employees to take a polygraph test.
along with other employees.

The plaintiff took the test

The test was conducted by Defendant

Western States using questions supplied by the defendant Fashion
Gal.

The examiner reported to Fashion Gal that the plaintiff

satisfactorily completed the test, with the exception that they
APPENDIX M 3 M
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found possible deception in response to the question "Do you know
for certain who has cheated or stolen anything from Fashion Gal
store?"

As a result of this possible deception, the defendant

requested a second polygraph test which plaintiff passed.
second test was conducted by a different examiner.

The

Whereupon

defendant requested plaintiff take a third polygraph examination,
which she refused.
take a third

Whereupon she was terminated for refusing to

test.

Thereafter, plaintiff,

employment, applied at Brooks in Ogden.

in

seeking

other

When the manager of

Brooks called the Defendant Fashion Gal store for a reference,
Jolyn Flint, manager of the store, reported that the plaintiff
had refused to take a polygraph test and that was the basis for
her termination.
thereupon
action,

She did not get the job at Brooks.

filed
and

this

complaint

defendants

herein

setting
have

forth

filed

four

their

Plaintiff
causes

motions

of
for

summary judgment.
First cause of action is entitled "Negligent Misrepresentation".

The essence of Count I is that Western owed plain-

tiff a duty to conduct a fair test and exercise reasonable care
and

competence

Defendant

in

Fashion

obtaining
Gal

failed

its
to

conclusions,
exercise

and

reasonable

determining the standards employed b*T Western.

that
care

the
in

This does not set

out a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, or even
for

negligence,

nothing

inasmuch

to do with

the

as

the

reasons

interpretation

of

for
the

termination

has

test, but

the
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failure to take an additional test.

Plaintiff was not discharged

for failing the test and the method of conducting or interpretation does not relate to the reason for which

she was fired.

Defendant Fashion Gal is granted summary judgment as to Count I.
Count II entitled "Defamationf Injurious Falsehood, and
Interference

with

Prospective

Economic

Advantage",

basically

hinges on the difference between a polygraph test and the third
polygraph test.

Frankly, it appears to be a play on words to a

certain extent.

However, I feel that the pleading in this cause

of action does establish an issue of material fact which must be
viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff; motion for
summary judgment is denied for Count II.
As

to

the

third

count,

"Outrageous

Conduct

Causing

Severe Emotional Distress", the record herein does not support
the assertion of plaintiff that the conduct of the defendant was
so outrageous and extreme that it offended the generally acceptable standards of decency and morality.

There is no genuine

issue as to any material fact in regard to this count and defendant is granted summary judgment on Count III.
As to the counts for "Wrongful Termination and Breach of
Implied

Condition

Discharge"

of

Employment

Contract"

and

"Wrongful

(tort), the question herein basically appears to be

whether or not the policy manual is the "express or implied"
exception to the "at will" rules, together with the question of
good faith and fair dealing.

Viewing the matter in a light most

Page 4
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favorable to the plaintiff, it appears there may be a genuine
issue of material fact sufficient to warrant trial.

Defendants'

motion for summary judgment on these counts is denied.
In regard

to Western

Polygraph1s

motion

for

summary

judgment, it appears that they conducted an examination at the
request of Defendant Fashion
plaintiff.

Centre, with the consent of the

The taking of the test, the method of taking the

test, or the interpretation of the test was not the cause of the
discharge of plaintiff.

The cause of her discharge was the

failure to take the third polygraph test.

The basis of the

action is wrongful discharge and defamation, none of which apply
to the Defendant Western.
xhere does not appear to be a genuine issue as to any
material

fact,

and

the

Defendant

Torman

dba

Western

States

Polygraph1s motion for summary judgment is granted.
Attorney for Fashion Centre is to prepare an order in
accordance herewith.
DATED this / 7) day of December, 1984.
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J^"^INSTRUCTION NO. ~"~—<L

// V
The Plainti£f_Shirley Berube.,.has -alleged a claim against the
Defendant Fashion..Certtr'e' Ltd. claiming that she was wrongfully
terminated".
—-—... you are instructed that there is an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing in every contract that neither party will
do anything which will injure the rights of the other to receive
the benefits of the agreement.

c
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You^a^e—i-nstrueted^tha.t., lji^the employment contract «*~*iw,s
£^fte-r—there is an implied obligation of good faith and fair
dealing on part of both parties, that an employee will not be

•

discharged without good cause.

w

The term "good cause" as used in these instructions, means
"a fair and honest cause or reason regulated by good faith on the
part of the employer."
*•" " ""'An employer that discharges an employee without good cause
is liable for a wrongful discharge and all damages proximately
resulting from such discharge.

In considering whether an employer

acted in good faith or bad faith in discharging an employee from
employment, you should consider all the evidence which tends to
establish either good or bad faith, including but not limited to
evidence of the following factors:
1.

whether or not the employee was discharged for ligi-

timate business and employment reasons;
2.

whether or not an employee was discharged on a pre-

text, that is, for a false reason or motive put forth to hide the
APPENDIX "4"
onA?

r&a1

3.

whether or not the employee was discharged in accor-

dance with the personnel\policy and procedures of the employer;
\

4.

any other facts in evidence which tend to establish
/

either good or bad faith.

Before you can find the Defendant Fashion Centre Ltd. liable
\

for wrongful termination, you must\find the following has been
proved by a preponderance of the evidence:
A.

The employer Fashion Ceht\e Ltd. acted in bad
faith in discharging/the Plaintiff Shirley Berube
//

as assistant manager.
z
If the preponderance of ,the evidence doesv support the claim
\

of Shirley Berube, then your verdict should be for Shirley Berube
and against Fashion Centre/Ltd.
/

The term "preponderance of the evidence" means the greater
weight of the evidence, thai is, such evidence as, when weighed
with that opposed to it, is more convincing as to its truth.

Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, Utah, 636 P.2d 1063
(1981)
Leigh Funiture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, Utah, 657 P.2s 293, 311 (1982)

INSTRUCTION NO.

Plaintiff

alleges

that

£

she had

either an express or

implied employment contract with defendant.

Plaintiff further

alleges that she abided by the terms of said agreement but that
defendant violated the conditions of the agreement and wrongfully
terminated

plaintiff's

employment.

Plaintiff

further

that, as a result of such wrongful termination
monetary

damage

and,

therefore

asks

for

a

alleges

she suffered

judgment

against

defendant for such damage.
Defendant alleges that no specific employment contract
existed and thus plaintiff could be discharged at any time with
or without cause.
Defendant

further

alleges that in the event

it is

determined that an employment contract existed, that plaintiff
violated the rules of the agreement andf therefore, defendant, was
justified in terminating her employment.

Defendant also alleges

that plaintiff has failed to adequately prove that she suffered
damage as a result of the termination of her employment.
The

above

is not meant

to be a statement

of

facts

proven, but is a paraphrasing of the allegations of the parties.

APPENDIX M5

INSTRUCTION NO.

/ 3

The burden of proof is upon plaintiff to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that an employment contract between
himself and Defendant did in fact exist.
If plaintiff fails to satisfy this burden of proof,
plaintiff cannot recover upon her breach of contract claim and
you must find for defendant on the breach of contract claim.

nor*

INSTRUCTION NO. /£"*

If
preponderance

you

find

that

plaintiff

has

proven,

by

a

of the evidence, that a contract of employment

existed between her and defendant and that the terms of this
contract were as alleged by plaintiff, then you must decide
whether

plaintiff

has

proven, by

a

preponderance

of

the

evidence, that defendant discharged plaintiff in violation of
the terms of their contract.
If you find either that plaintiff voluntarily resigned
her position or that she was discharged
violation

of

the

terms

of

the

for

reasons not in

contract, you must

return a

verdict for defendant on plaintiff's breach of contract claim.
If you find that plaintiff was discharged in violation
of the terms of the contract, you must return a verdict for
plaintiff on her breach of contract claim.
You are instructed that there is an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in every contract that neither party
will do anything which will injure the rights of the other to
receive the benefits of the agreement.
In the case of an employment contract, there is an
implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing on part of
both parties, that an employee will not be discharged without
good cause.
The term "good cause" as used in these instructions,
means "a fair and honest cause or reason regulated by good faith
on the part of the employer".

